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Capgras syndrome: a novel probe for understanding
the neural representation of the identity and familiarity
of persons
WILLIAM HIRSTEIN and V. S. RAMACHANDRAN*
Brain and Perception Laborator 0109, Uniersit of California, San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093, USA
SUMMARY
Patients with Capgras syndrome regard people whom they know well such as their parents or siblings as
imposters. Here we describe a case (DS) of this syndrome who presents several novel features. DS was
unusual in that his delusion was modality-specific: he claimed that his parents were imposters when he
was looking at them but not when speaking to them on the telephone. Unlike normals, DS’s skin
conductance responses to photographs of familiar people, including his parents, were not larger in
magnitude than his responses to photographs of unfamiliar people. We suggest that in this patient
connections from face-processing areas in the temporal lobe to the limbic system have been damaged, a
loss which may explain why he calls his parents imposters. In addition, DS was very poor at judging gaze
direction. Finally, when presented with a sequence of photographs of the same model’s face looking in
different directions, DS asserted that they were ‘different women who looked just like each other ’. In the
absence of limbic activation, DS creates separate memory ‘files ’ of the same person, apparently because
he is unable to extract and link the common denominator of successive episodic memories. Thus, far from
being a medical curiosity, Capgras syndrome may help us to explore the formation of new memories
caught in flagrante delicto.
1. INTRODUCTION: FACING REALITY
The Capgras delusion is one of the rarest and most
colourful syndromes in neurology (Capgras & Reboul-
Lachaux 1923; Ellis & Young 1990). The most striking
feature of this disorder is that the patient—who is often
mentally quite lucid in other respects—comes to regard
close acquaintances, typically either his parents,
children, spouse or siblings, as ‘ imposters ’, i.e. he may
claim that the person in question ‘ looks like ’ or is even
‘ identical to ’ his father, but really isn’t. Although
frequently seen in psychotic states, over a third of the
documented cases of Capgras syndrome have occurred
in conjunction with traumatic brain lesions, suggesting
that the syndrome has an organic basis (Signer 1994).
Capgras syndrome should be distinguished from a
related class of disorders called prosopagnosia, charac-
terized by an inability to recognize people’s faces
(Damasio 1985; Farah 1990). Prosopagnosia is usually
caused by bilateral lesions in the inferior temporal
lobes (IT), regions of the brain thought to be at least
partially specialized for face recognition (Damasio et al.
1982). When given a mixture of photographs of
unfamiliar (novel) and familiar faces and asked to sort
them into two piles, prosopagnosics are unable to do
so; yet remarkably, they register a stronger skin
conductance response to familiar faces (as do normals),
implying that the face-processing machinery is still
connected to the limbic system (Bauer 1984, 1986;
* To whom correspondence should be addressed.
Tranel & Damasio 1985, 1988; Bruyer 1991; Dennett
1996). Apparently there are two components to the
visual recognition of a familiar face, one of which is
responsible for conscious recognition of the face and
the recall of associated semantic information, whereas
the other is responsible for the limbic-mediated
emotional arousal—the emotional valence, including
the feeling of familiarity, that accompanies the con-
scious recognition of a familiar face. A dissociation
between these two would not only explain states such
as deU ja[ u (familiarity without recognition) and jamais u
(recognition without familiarity), that are sometimes
associated with temporal lobe seizures (Bancaud et al.
1994), but would also explain why it is possible to get
a skin conductance response even in the absence of
conscious recognition of a face.
Adapting an explanation by Bauer (1984, 1986),
Ellis & Young (1990) have suggested that the Capgras
syndrome represents a ‘mirror image’ of prosopagnosia
in that the ventral route from the visual centres to the
temporal lobes may be preserved (so as to allow overt,
conscious face ‘recognition’), but the dorsal visual
route responsible for giving the face its emotional
significance is damaged. Perhaps the only way the
patient can make sense of the absence of this emotional
arousal is to form the belief that the person he is
looking at is an imposter.
This explanation leaves two questions unanswered,
however. First, why is the phenomenon specific to close
relatives? One possibility is that only with one’s parents
or spouse does one expect a glow of arousal, and
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therefore its absence leads to a confabulatory delusion
that one’s parent is an imposter. With an emotionally
neutral person on the other hand, such as one’s
mailman, one does not expect such arousal, and
therefore there is no incentive for generating a delusion.
A second related question is, why does the mere
absence of this emotional arousal lead to such an
extraordinarily far-fetched delusion? Why doesn’t the
patient just think, ‘I know that is my father but I no
longer feel the warmth’? One answer is that some
additional lesion, perhaps in the right frontal cortex,
may be required to generate such extreme delusions. In
trying to explain a completely different syndrome
(anosognosia) we have argued elsewhere that the left
hemisphere seeks to preserve consistency at all costs by
explaining away any discrepancies, whereas there may
be a global ‘consistency-checking’ mechanism in the
right hemisphere which ordinarily serves to counter-
balance this tendency (Ramachandran 1995). Damage
to such a mechanism may explain the extreme
confabulations that one often sees in anosognosics
following a right hemisphere stroke: the implausible
explanation produced by the left hemisphere is no
longer censored by the right hemishere. It may be,
therefore, that to develop a full-blown Capgras
delusion one needs a conjunction of two lesions : one
which affects the brain’s ability to attach emotional
significance to a familiar face, and one which affects
the global consistency-checking mechanism in the right
hemisphere.
We recently had the opportunity to study an
intelligent and mentally lucid young man who de-
veloped Capgras syndrome following a head injury.
One of our goals was to test the hypothesis that his face-
recognition mechanisms were intact, but disconnected
from limbic areas. Our prediction was that unlike
prosopagnosics he should experience no difficulty in
distinguishing familiar faces from unfamiliar ones, but
should show a loss of the normal skin conductance
response to familiar faces. We tested this directly in our
patient (DS), and in the course of doing so discovered
some novel and hitherto undescribed aspects of this
syndrome (Ramachandran 1996). One phenomenon
in particular, DS’s occasional inability to link
successive episodic memories of the same person,
may illuminate how new memories are formed and
organized.
2. CASE DESCRIPTION
DS was a 30-year-old Brazilian man who had been
in a coma for three weeks following a head injury
(right parietal fracture) sustained in a traffic accident.
During the subsequent year, he made remarkable
progress in regaining speech, intelligence, and other
cognitive skills. He was brought to us by his parents
principally because of his tendency to regard them as
imposters. When we first saw him he appeared to be an
alert and fairly intelligent young man who was not
obviously hysterical, anxious or dysphoric. A ‘mini ’
mental status exam (serial sevens, three objects,
writing, orientation in time and place, etc.) revealed no
obvious deficits in higher functions, and there was no
evidence of dementia.
The most striking aspects of his disorder were that he
regarded his father as an ‘ imposter ’ and he had a
similar, although less compelling, delusion about his
mother. When asked why he thought his father was an
imposter his response was ‘He looks exactly like my
father but he really isn’t. He’s a nice guy, but he isn’t
my father, Doctor’. The following dialogue then
occurred:
Experimenter (E)
‘But why was this man pretending to be your father? ’
Patient (P)
‘That is what is so surprising, Doctor—why should anyone
want to pretend to be my father? Maybe my father employed
him to take care of me—paid him some money so that he
could pay my bills… ’
According to his parents he had entertained these
delusions for the two years since he had been
discharged. Interestingly, they related that DS never
treated either parent as an imposter when speaking
with them over the telephone—the difficulty arose only
in the visual modality. This is inconsistent with a
recent suggestion by Luaute & Bidault (1994) that
Capgras is similar to hemineglect in being supramodal.
The unimodality of DS’s delusion is important, for it
implies that the patient is not simply ‘crazy’ ; his
delusions are confined to the visual modality, as one
might expect from our inferotemporal-limbic discon-
nection hypothesis. The finding also implies that DS
does not simply have retrograde amnesia with regard
to his parents. A similar dissociation is often seen in
prosopagnosia—the patient cannot recognize familiar
people by sight, but can do so when listening to their
voices.
According to the parents, other people who were
once familiar to DS were readily recognized by him
and did not provoke the delusion that they were
imposters, a finding typical of Capgras patients.
Interestingly, DS also had the delusion with regard to
pictures of himself :
E: (pointing to photograph of DS from two years ago
when he had a moustache) : ‘Whose picture is this? ’
P: ‘That is another DS who looks identical to me but he
isn’t me—he has a moustache. ’
This delusion could not be provoked in DS simply by
any visual image of himself, for instance it did not
occur when DS looked at himself in a mirror.
DS’s tendency to ‘duplicate ’ himself—that is to
regard himself as a distinct person from a former DS—
also sometimes emerged spontaneously during con-
versation. For instance, on one occasion he volun-
teered, ‘Yes they sent a check, but they sent it to the
other DS. ’ Again, other than this very odd remark
there was nothing in his conversation to suggest
psychopathology. DS usually did not regard objects as
duplicates but on some occasions he would run his
fingers through his own hair and call it a ‘wig—not my
hair ’, partly because his scalp felt odd and unfamiliar
as a result of scars from the neurosurgery he had
undergone. On rare occasions, DS also duplicated
countries, claiming at one point that there were two
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Panamas (where he had recently gone to for a family
reunion) and two United States.
One final point is worth noting. DS’s father had seen
one of us (V.S.R.) on television demonstrating ‘that
the brain could be tricked by simply using a mirror ’
to relieve phantom-limb pain (Ramachandran et al.
1995; Ramachandran & Rogers-Ramachandran
1996). Although he realized that phantom limbs were
unrelated to the Capgras delusion, DS’s father began
to wonder whether a similar ‘ simple trick’ could be
used on his son to help him get rid of his delusion. To
achieve this his father adopted the following extra-
ordinary procedure: He walked into his son’s room one
day and announced, ‘ the man who you have been with
all these days is an imposter—he isn’t really your
father. I have sent him away to China. I am your real
father—it’s so good to see you son. ’ DS’s delusion
seemed to abate slightly after this ‘ treatment, ’ as
evidenced by the following dialogue:
E: ‘Who is the man who brought you today?’
P: ‘My father. ’
E: ‘Who was taking care of you?’
P: ‘That guy has gone back to China. He looked very similar
to my father, but he is gone now. ’
Yet during a subsequent interview a week later DS
had reverted to his original delusion, claiming that the
imposter had returned. Also, his father told us in
confidence that although DS had accepted him now
as his father ‘ intellectually ’, he had not yet done so
emotionally. We are now planning to try variants of
this ‘ treatment’ on other Capgras patients to see
whether a more permanent improvement can be
achieved.
3. LESION ANALYSIS
A CT scan without contrast revealed that all
ventricles were enlarged without change, with the right
lateral ventricle being especially large. Bilateral areas
of encephalomalacia were noted, most prominent
bifrontally. Of course, a subtle disconnection between
IT and the limbic system of the kind we have postulated
here would not be visible on a CT scan, but we are
planning future imaging studies on this patient using
fMRI and PET. Previous studies on Capgras patients
have found lesions predominantly in the temporal
(Signer 1994) and right fronto-parietal (Benson 1994)
cortices, which is consistent with our two-lesion (IT-
limbic, and right fronto-parietal) hypothesis.
4. RESULTS
(a) Experiment 1 : electrodermal response to
familiar versus unfamiliar faces
(i) Rationale
The Capgras delusion may be a functional mirror
image of prosopagnosia, in that the Capgras patient
visually ‘recognizes ’ a familiar face, but lacks the
emotional ‘glow’ that such a face would normally
evoke (which is associated with the skin conductance
response one sees in prosopagnosics when they are
shown familiar faces).
(ii) Procedure
Electrodermal activity was measured as skin con-
ductance magnitude between the middle phalanges of
the index and middle finger of the subject’s left hand.
Dermal contact areas were cleaned with alcohol and
lightly abraded. Silver}silver-chloride electrodes were
then affixed with velcro straps. Skin conductance
response signals went first to a UFI model 2701 skin
conductance meter, which also displayed skin con-
ductance level, then into a MacIntosh computer,
which amplified and displayed the data.
The sets of photos seen by the subjects contained
images of people DS had delusions about (mother,
father, self, grandfather) and well-known faces (Bill
Clinton, Albert Einstein, Elizabeth Taylor, Michael
Jordan, etc.), randomly interleaved with pictures of
unfamiliar people taken from people’s family photo-
graphs. The control group consisted of six college
undergraduates. Before the experiment, subjects were
told that they would be shown pictures of faces, some
of which would be familiar to them, some of which
would be unfamiliar. After the electrodes were
attached, subjects were given a period to establish
baseline SCR activity, then each photograph was
shown for 2 s, with the experimenter waiting between
photos for SCR levels to return to baseline, typically
from 15 to 25 s, prior to showing the next image.
Following Tranel & Damasio (1988) only the largest
skin conductance response within a latency window of
1–5 s was recorded. DS was tested on three separate
occasions, with three different photograph sets, over a
six-week period with this procedure, referred to as DS
I, DS II, and DS III in table 1. Responses to familiar
faces were compared with responses to unfamiliar faces
using the Mann–Whitney U-test (Siegel 1956), a
nonparametric test that can be used on data from
distributions which are not normal (SCR distributions
are non-normal (Venables & Christie 1980)).
(iii) Results
See table 1.
(b) Experiment 2 : accuracy of judgements of gaze
direction
(i) Rationale
Some Capgras patients have been shown to have
other problems processing faces (Young et al. 1993),
and amygdalotomy has been shown to affect ability to
judge gaze direction (Young et al. 1995). Also, Teske
(1988) has shown that normal individuals are more
inclined to judge, mistakenly, that a person is looking
at them if that person is familiar. Given this link
between gaze direction and familiarity, we wondered
whether gaze hyperacuity—the ability to judge where
a face in a photograph is looking (Gibson 1966; Anstis
et al. 1969)—would be impaired in our patient.
(ii) Procedure
Three different series of images were prepared. In
the first series, the same model looked either directly
at the camera lens, or at a point 4 or 8 cm to the
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Table 1. Skin conductance response magnitudes (in microSiemens). Numbers in ‘mean ’ columns correspond to mean response
magnitudes ; percentages of non-ero responses are included under ‘ frequenc ’
familiar unfamiliar
n
frequency
% mean s.d. U n
frequency
% mean s.d. U
DS
I 7 71 0.12 0.18 21 p" 0.05 8 50 0.03 0.03 36 p" 0.05
II 3 100 0.64 0.41 17 p" 0.05 13 100 0.55 0.32 15 p" 0.05
III 7 86 0.46 0.32 80.5 p" 0.05 16 81 0.72 0.42 31.5 p" 0.05
control group
S1 3 100 0.29 0.05 3 24 25 0.03 0.08 2.55 p! 0.01
S2 6 83 0.35 0.27 17 17 82 0.08 0.08 p! 0.01
S3 5 100 0.19 0.23 17.5 18 82 0.07 0.10 p! 0.05
S4 3 100 0.76 0.40 4.5 17 100 0.15 0.27 p! 0.05
S5 5 80 0.54 0.42 34 24 36 0.27 0.40 1.50
S6 6 83 0.35 0.35 28 22 48 0.07 0.10 2.21 p! 0.05
  values.
Table 2. Accurac judging gae direction
degrees of deviation… 3.3 6.6 9.9
DS 4}24 (17%) 9}23 (39%) 3}6 (50%)
controls (n¯ 7) 67}96 (70%) 79}80 (99%) 9}9 (100%)
right or left of the lens. Since the model was 0.7 m
from the camera lens, the 4 cm offset corresponded to
3.3° of visual angle, and the 8 cm offset to 6.6°. The
second series also contained images of models diverting
their eyes an additional 4 cm from centre (9.9° of visual
angle). Finally, a third series was administered two
weeks later.
(iii) Results
See table 2. For the first series of 30 photographs, DS
answered that the model was looking at him for every
one, hence he was only correct on the seven trials in
which the model actually was looking at him. Only in
a second set of trials, where the model’s eyes were
sometimes 9.9° off centre, did DS’s accuracy improve.
Remarkably, on the eighth trial of the first series
of 30, DS claimed that the identity of the model had
changed, even though all the photographs were, of
course, of the same person. ‘This one is older ’ he
asserted, adding that this was a picture of a different
woman from the one depicted in the earlier trials
(‘This is a lady, the other one is a girl ’). Later in the
testing, DS made another partition, so that now there
were three models according to him, which he
described as an old one, a young one, and a second
young one, slightly younger than the other. When
questioned at the end of testing, he was consistent and
stated that there had been three models. During a
subsequent gaze direction test with a new model, DS
again claimed that there were two different models,
making the partition at about the same trial as he did
during the first test. This test had fewer trials, so
perhaps DS did not have time to create a third identity
for the model.
DS showed the same tendency to assign many
identities to a single model when he was retested two
weeks later.
(c) Experiment 3 : accuracy of face discrimination
(i) Rationale
Is it possible that DS simply had a problem in
discriminating faces? This seemed unlikely from the
fact that he recognized famous faces such as those of
Clinton and Einstein, but we also conducted a more
formal experiment.
(ii) Procedure
The stimuli consisted of nine pairs of photographs of
college students not known to DS. Each pair was of the
same person taken from two different points of view. In
each trial, DS was simultaneously shown either two
photographs of different people, or two (different)
photographs of the same person, and he was to say
whether the photographs depicted the same person or
not. This test consisted of 16 trials.
(iii) Results
DS was correct on 14}16 trials. Four normals were
tested with this set of photos, and all achieved scores of
16}16. DS tended to look closely at the details of the
faces, rather than taking in the whole face as a
‘gestalt ’.
(d) Experiment 4 : perception of emotions in others
(i) Rationale
Perhaps the failure of DS’s brain to produce a larger
SCR when he sees close relatives is part of a larger
Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B (1997)
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disturbance in his emotional ability. To rule this out,
we tested DS’s ability to sense emotions in others with
the following experiment.
(ii) Procedure
A series of eight pairs of digitized images of models
posing basic emotions such as fear, anger, and
happiness (from Ekman 1975) were used. In each pair,
the two images were either of the same model or of two
different ones, and the emotions expressed were either
the same or different. Each time, DS was asked what
emotion the models were expressing, and whether they
were expressing the same emotion.
(iii) Results
DS was accurate in saying which emotion was
expressed, and whether the two models were expressing
the same emotion or not. Thus DS’s ability to
discriminate emotions is largely spared; what is
compromised is his ability to link particular familiar
faces with the appropriate affect in his memory.
6. DISCUSSION : THE UNBEARABLE
LIKENESS OF BEING
‘One can’t believe impossible things. ’
‘I daresay you haven’t had much practice, ’ said the
ueen. ‘When I was your age I always did it for half-an-hour
a day. Why, sometimes I ’ve believed as many as six
impossible things before breakfast. ’
Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass
During the last three decades, considerable progress
had been made in understanding the neural basis of
memory formation, but most of this research falls into
two categories : (1) investigation of the actual synaptic
changes (e.g. LTP) involved—studied elegantly in
aplysia (Matzel et al. 1992; Skehel et al. 1995) and
in in itro hippocampal slices (Oliver et al. 1989;
Sejnowski et al. 1989); and (2) investigation of antero-
grade amnesia results from medial temporal lobe}
hippocampal damage (Milner et al. 1968; Mishkin
1978; Squire 1987; Weiskrantz 1987; Schachter
1995). Surprisingly, the equally important narrative or
‘constructive ’ aspects of human memory, for example,
the mechanisms of retrieval, the creation of new
categories and a tacit taxonomy of these categories
(e.g. tokens versus types), the encoding of spatial and
temporal context, and the binding of objects across
successive episodic memories, have rarely been
studied experimentally—although their importance
was recognized as far back as Bartlett (1932). The vast
psychological literature on this topic is largely un-
informative ; in particular, we have no idea of what the
neural substrates of these elusive mechanisms might be.
Our research suggests that Capgras, and other allied
delusional misidentification syndromes, such as Fregoli
syndrome (in which the patient tends to misidentify
several strangers as a single prototype whom he knows
already, Courbon & Fail (1927)), might provide a
valuable opportunity to experimentally probe these
enigmatic aspects of human memory.
Bauer (1984, 1986) suggested that the reason that
prosopagnosics register a skin conductance response
when they see familiar faces is that this response is
mediated by the dorsal stream of visual processing
leaving the occipital lobe, which is intact, whereas the
ventral stream, which is presumably responsible for
conscious recognition of faces, is damaged. Ellis &
Young (1990) adapted this approach to Capgras
syndrome, making the ingenious suggestion that
Capgras is a mirror image of prosopagnosia : damaged
dorsal stream, intact ventral stream. There are several
problems with this idea, however: (1) postcentral
lesions in Capgras patients are more often located in
the temporal lobes than in the occipital or parietal
lobes (Signer 1994); (2) the dorsal visual stream
primarily contains information from peripheral vision,
whereas our visual interactions with people would
seem to involve mainly focal vision, a ventral stream
function; (3) the ventral stream has dense reciprocal
connections to the amygdala (Amaral et al. 1992),
which is strongly implicated in the skin conductance
response (although apparently not necessary for it,
Tranel & Damasio 1989; Lee et al. 1989), whereas the
dorsal stream does not ; (4) Some Capgras patients
sometimes also have face-processing impairments
(Young et al. 1993), another ventral stream function.
We propose instead that the principal cause of Capgras
is a failure of communication between areas of ventral
stream processing in the temporal lobe (e.g. IT and
other face-sensitive areas around the superior temporal
sulcus) and the limbic complex, especially the
amygdala. This failure of communication leads to
disturbances in memory ‘management’ of the kind
seen in DS, specifically a relatively intact or even
exaggerated ability to individuate different episodic
memories, but a deterioration in the ability to generate
enduring categories (e.g. ‘my father ’) by extracting
and linking a common denominator across successive
episodes.
The Capgras syndrome is often regarded merely as a
face recognition problem, but we would like to suggest
that it is really part of a more general memory
management problem. When you or I meet a new
person, our brains open a new file, as it were, into
which go all of our memories of interactions with this
person. When DS meets a person who is genuinely new
to him, his brain creates a file for this person and the
associated experiences, as it should. But if the person
leaves the room for 30 minutes and returns, DS’s brain,
instead of retrieving the old file and continuing to add
to it, sometimes creates a completely new one. Why this
should happen is unclear, but it may be that the
limbic}emotional activation from familiar faces is
missing and the absence of this ‘glow’ is a signal for the
brain to create a separate file for this face (or else the
presence of the ‘glow’ is needed for developing links
between successive episodes involving a person).
Alternatively, there may be a more basic flaw in DS’s
ability to extract and integrate the common de-
nominator of successive episodic memories—a sort of
temporal binding or mnemonic ‘figure-ground’ prob-
lem. Whatever the reason, DS’s response to this failure
is to assert that he is meeting a new person, one who
looks very much like another person he just met. It is
crucial to point out that DS has not lost his earlier
Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B (1997)
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episodic memories of the person; he remembers the
‘other ’ person, but simply behaves as if he has met two
different people, and creates separate files for them.
Again, consistent with the IT-limbic disconnection
hypothesis, his problem is confined to the visual
modality ; DS can recognize his parents over the
phone. Since the amygdala receives polymodal sensory
input, the disconnection might be specifically between
IT and the amygdala rather than say, amygdala and
the hippocampus. A problem of this kind may underlie
not only Capgras syndrome but also its parent category,
reduplicative paramnesia (Pick 1903)—the belief that
objects have been replaced by duplicates—as well as
the occasional memory duplications seen in Korsakoff’s
patients (Zangwill 1941). Finally, one wonders
whether a strengthening of these very same connections
might underlie other delusional states. For instance,
kindling in the amygdala of the kind that occurs in
temporal lobe seizures might form the basis of inter-
ictal religious experiences, with the patient ascribing
deep meaning and cosmic significance to everything
around him. Alternatively, if the strengthening was less
global and occurred for a single face node, the result
might be deClerambault’s syndrome (deClerambault
1942; Anstis, personal communication), an over-
whelming romantic obsession that some young women
develop with a single older man.
DS’s memory partitioning problem showed itself in
an extreme form while we were testing his ability to
judge gaze direction. Recall that the test consisted of 30
digitized images of the same model looking either
directly at the camera or 8 cm to the right or left of the
camera lens. For each trial, the subject merely had to
tell us whether or not the model’s eyes were directed at
him, but his response was to assert repeatedly that the
identity of the model had changed. This finding nicely
complements the intriguing observation of Teske
(1988) who found that when normal people are asked
to judge gaze direction, they are more likely to assert
that familiar people are looking at them.
DS’s tendency to ‘split ’ people into multiple copies
occurred only on some occasions, and more often with
photographs of a person than in the person’s presence.
Such a waxing and waning of symptoms, of course, is
only to be expected given that what we are dealing
with here is not a ‘pure’ or classical anatomical
disconnection of the kind Geschwind (1965) postulated
for alexia without agraphia but, rather, a mis-
communication between ‘ face’ cells (or ‘person- ’ or
‘object-identity nodes ’ (Gross 1992; Tovee et al. 1996))
in the temporal lobe, and the temporal ‘chunking’ and
binding mechanisms in the hippocampus and the
amygdala (consistent with this view, ‘ face cells ’ in the
amygdala are thought to be involved in linking
successive views of the same face across time (Rolls
1995)). Our theory of partial functional disconnection
would also explain why DS tended to duplicate more
often with memories or photographs of people than in
the presence of the people themselves. For example, on
some occasions, when shown a photograph of his
father, DS would identify him correctly, but in
recalling the photograph a few minutes later claim that
it was of ‘ that Jewish gentleman who looks like my
father. ’ When retrieving the memory trace, DS
presumably dredges up a somewhat impoverished
representation that fails to evoke limbic arousal,
causing him to label its object an imposter, whereas
when he is in the presence of his father there are a
sufficient number of salient cues to adequately activate
the limbic areas. (This would also explain why he
regarded old photographs of himself as ‘another DS’
but never experienced the delusion while looking in a
mirror.) On this hypothesis, one would expect a great
deal of variability across different Capgras patients,
depending on the extent of ‘disconnection’. It would
be interesting to test Capgras patients systematically to
see whether the delusion is evoked more reliably by
memories of a person, or perhaps with degraded
photographs, than by the actual person.
DS was impaired in neither his perception of
emotions in others, nor in expressing his own emotions.
He was able to gauge correctly when two different
models were expressing the same emotion or a different
one, and to say which emotion the models were
expressing. During the course of testing, DS expressed
happiness, laughed and expressed impatience, and also
showed the normal skin conductance responses to
rapid, deep breathing and sudden loud noises, which
seems to indicate that the limbic system itself is intact.
Taken together with the fact that his ability to
discriminate faces (experiment 3) is only mildly
impaired, this would again seem to indicate that the
communication between IT and the limbic system is
impaired. In our view, this hypothesis is at least as
seductive as the psychoanalytical view (Franzini &
Grossberg 1995) that the Capgras delusion arises
because of an ‘unmasking’ of latent, anxiety-provoking
Oedipal impulses toward the mother (and sexual
jealousy toward the father) followed by an attempt to
resolve anxiety by calling them imposters (if she is my
mother, why am I sexually attracted to her?). We find
this latter theory to be highly implausible, given that
there are documented instances of Capgras patients
who believe that their pet dog has also been replaced
by a duplicate !
In each of three tests, conducted over a six-week
period, DS failed to show a difference between his skin
conductance response to familiar people and his
response to unfamiliars. Of course, given that this is a
single case study, and given the inherent difficulties of
the SCR technique, this result should be regarded as
highly tentative and as requiring confirmation in
additional patients. But taken at face value the results
are broadly consistent with the IT-limbic discon-
nection hypothesis—that it is the failure of faces to
evoke the appropriate affective memories that leads DS
to regard his parents as imposters. Interestingly, on
some trials there were long-latency (between 4.5 and 6
seconds) SCR responses suggesting that DS sometimes
relies on an alternative, more inferential means of
identifying people, with an SCR delay reflecting this
more circuituous route to the limbic system.
DS also occasionally appeared to have a general
problem with visual categories—a ‘taxonomy’ prob-
lem. All of us have certain covert taxonomies of events
and objects in our brains, e.g. ducks and geese are
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birds, but rabbits are not. We did not specifically test
this in DS but his remarks sometimes hinted at this
possibility. For instance, he had an almost obsessive
preoccupation with Jews and Catholics, and he tended
to label a disproportionate number of recently
encountered people as Jews. Is it conceivable that a
similar Fregoli-like confusion can occur in otherwise
normal brains, forming a basis for racist stereotypes? It
is noteworthy that racism is so often directed at a single
physical type (e.g. Blacks, Asians, etc.). Perhaps a
single unpleasant episode with one member of a visual
category sets up a limbic connection that is
inappropriately generalized to include all members of
that class and is notoriously impervious to ‘ top-down’
intellectual correction. Indeed, one’s intellectual views
may be coloured (no pun intended) by this emotional
knee-jerk reaction.
Perhaps the oddest aspect of DS’s mnemonic
problems is his tendency to regard himself as a double,
a tendency for which there are two possible
explanations (which are not mutually exclusive). First,
photographs of himself from the past did not evoke
limbic activation and warm feelings, and the person in
the photographs is therefore to be rejected as ‘another
DS’ (however bizarre that may seem to us with our
intact brains). Second, his loss of emotional contact
with people who matter to him most, such as his own
parents, may lead him to say to himself : ‘The reason I
don’t experience warmth is that they don’t recognize
me, and that in turn must be because I ’m not the real
DS. ’ Indeed, on one occasion he made the following
poignant remark to his mother: ‘Mother, if the real DS
ever returns do you promise that you will still treat me
as a friend and love me?’
Philosophers have often emphasized that if there is
any aspect of our own lives that we can regard as
axiomatic and beyond question, it is our own personal
identity. This sense of a single, unified ‘self ’ runs like a
golden thread through the whole fabric of our
experience. The Capgras patient, on the other hand,
inhabits a strange no-man’s land between illusion and
reality where even this sense of an enduring, unitary
self can no longer be assumed. Studying these patients
may therefore not only allow us to observe the
formation of new memories ‘ in slow motion’ so to
speak, but also may give us insights into how the brain
creates a sense of seamless unity from a lifetime of
diverse sensory experiences.
We thank M. Al Aboudi and L. Stone for referring this
patient to us, F. H. C. Crick, E. Altschuler and C. Foster, for
stimulating discussions, and the NIMH for support.
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